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Transforming child welfare: From explicit to implicit control of families 
Through a historical review of child welfare laws and policies between 1896 and 
1992 in Norway, this article investigates the state control of families. The central 
questions in the article relate to the transformations in the forms of state control 
of families. The research on which the article is based has relied on a 
genealogical approach. The sources are comprised of previous studies focusing 
on the historical development of child welfare in Norway. The article argues that 
state control, from having been explicit in the late nineteenth century, has today 
become increasingly implicit and hidden. Indeed, the value granted to children’s 
rights and equality has made opposition to state interventions in families 
difficult. I relate the transformations in state control of families to the 
affirmation of the norms of ‘egalitarian individualism’. As Norway is amongst 
the first European countries to make child-centrism a hallmark of its social 
policies, these findings have implications for EU countries that may follow its 
path. 
Keywords: child welfare; social policy; critical reflection; history; family 
relationships  
 
Introduction 
An exploration through history and culture shows that children and families have long been 
considered as a single unit. However, in the last decades, the status of children has changed 
within many European countries because of a growing acknowledgment of children’s 
entitlement as well as of increasing knowledge about children’s lives. Following the adoption 
of the UN Convention on the Rights of children in 1989, many European countries have 
modified their child welfare laws in order to incorporate new views of children as subjects of 
rights. Guaranteeing children’s individual rights and securing effective interventions have 
become central concerns guiding both reforms of national child protection legislation and the 
redefinition of the duties of child welfare agencies. 
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While promoting and enhancing the position of the child within family, child 
protection laws at the same time tend to increase possibilities for state interventions in 
families and, in this sense, for control over families. Nearly four decades ago, Donzelot 
(1977) demonstrated how the state has controlled families through child welfare interventions. 
Other scholars have highlighted the tensions between emancipation and control in the field of 
child welfare (Ericsson, 2000; Hennum, 2010). However, the issue of the state control of 
families approached through the prism of the historical developments of child welfare has 
attracted little attention within social work research. By focusing more explicitly on the 
changes occurring over a century in the forms of state control of families, this article aims to 
expand findings of research on the historical transformations in child welfare (see Hering & 
Waaldijk 2005; Eydal & Satka, 2006; Skehill, 2007; Therborn, 1993). 
In the article, I conduct a historical review of studies examining Norwegian child 
welfare laws and policies in a historical perspective. The question the article poses is which 
transformations have occurred in the forms of state control of families from the late 
nineteenth century onwards. International comparative studies have underlined that Norway 
has been and remains a leading country in promoting children’s rights and equality. It was  the 
first country to grant children born outside of wedlock inheritance rights (1915); to ban 
corporal punishment (1972) and to create a child’s ombudsman (1981) (Therborn, 1993). 
Moreover, Norway is one of the countries that have gone furthest in adopting a ‘child-centric 
perspective’ in child welfare policies and practice (Skivenes, 2011, p. 154). Thus, Norway 
represents a valuable case for examining the transformations in the forms of state control of 
families over time.  
 
Genealogical approach to transformations in state intervention in families 
Foucault’s (1971, 1984) concept of genealogy, more broadly about his history of the present, 
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has inspired the research on the transformations in state control of families as reported in this 
article. The term genealogy refers to a particular form of history accounting for the social and 
historical conditions in which discourses are formed (Foucault, 1971). Genealogy is one of the 
strategies that Foucault used in order to ‘make the familiar visible’ (Chambon, 1999, p. 54). It 
is distinct from a search for the origins and does not aim to restore an unbroken continuity, 
but instead emphasises discontinuities, breaks and brutal transformations (Foucault, 1971, 
1984). Moreover, genealogy grants a central importance to uncovering relationships of 
domination (Foucault, 1984). Used here, the genealogical approach aims at making state 
control of the family through history visible. It will show how control changed from being 
open and clear to become obscured and implicit when the focus in child protection began 
emphasizing the individual child rather than the family or the parents as subject for state 
intervention.  
As Villadsen (2008) has argued, genealogy focuses on ‘historical moments when 
strategies of government and forms of knowledge are being questioned and transformed’ (p. 
95). As this article will show, some families are subjected to more control than others – and 
these are those considered as “deviant” by the law. This understanding of deviance changes 
through time depending on the knowledge base underpinning the law. With a child-centric 
perspective grounded in developmental psychology and attachment theory, the pathway 
leading to the assessment of a family as deviant in Norwegian society is shorter than ever.  
Using the Foucault’s genealogical approach makes it possible to investigate how some 
knowledge emerges as hegemonic at some times, while not at others. Furthermore, this 
approach shows how every historical period or epoch produces certain kinds of knowledge. 
These understandings provide one way for viewing how knowledge production underpins 
transformations of child welfare, and how each important alteration marks the family unit and 
restructures power relations between parents and children.  
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Amongst the various pieces of legislation related to child protection, three laws stand 
out as implementing major reforms: These are the Act on the treatment of neglected children 
of 1896 (Vergerådsloven), the child welfare Act of 1953 (Lov om barnevern) and the Child 
welfare Act of 1992 (Lov om barneverntjenester). In addition to these three key pieces of 
legislation, the Norwegian children Acts of 1915 (De castbergske barnelovene), though not 
dealing with child protection in the strict sense of the term, have made a central contribution 
to child welfare through affirming children’s equality and autonomy. All these laws have 
marked the historical path of Norwegian child welfare policies, and set the stage for the 
reforms of 1953 and 1992 built upon the values they promote. In this article, I use these four 
key pieces of legislation, as described in the secondary sources presented in the next section, 
as indicators of changes in the understanding of, and in the state intervention in, families 
(Chambon, 1999).   
Taken together, these four laws constitute a series of discursive events that are both 
continuous (they can be found in today’s discourses in child welfare) and discontinuous (each 
time, the new law deviated from what was established by introducing new elements in the 
discourses). For the sake of readability, the analysis of each period focuses on three main 
dimensions: (1) the legal changes and their implications for the forms of control of families, 
(2) the knowledge used by politicians for legitimizing child welfare interventions, and (3) 
social struggles and relations of domination.  
 
Data 
In exploring the historical pathway of Norwegian child welfare, I will rely on studies 
conducted by specialists within a number of disciplines focusing on child welfare in Norway. 
Central among those scholars providing in-depth analyses of the development of Norwegian 
child welfare have been criminologists (Dahl, 1978, in English 1985i ; Ericsson, 2000; Larsen, 
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2002), historians (Andresen, 2006; Haavet, 2006; Seip, 1987, 1994a) and jurists (Holthe, 
1985; Sandberg, 2003; Stang, 2007). Though being secondary sources, these studies provide 
fundamental knowledge about the period they cover. This knowledge is basic and widely used 
when studying or investigating Norwegian children welfare and, in this sense, these sources 
may be considered as valuable data worthy to be analysed. In the article, this body of 
knowledge is treated as cultural and historical expression in line with a Foucauldian approach 
to knowledge production situated in time and space. 
Analysing the transformations in state intervention in families will begin with 
examining the Act on the treatment of neglected children of 1896, marking the birth of a 
public child protection system in Norway, drawing on Dahl’s (1985) extensive study of this 
act. Then the examination will turn to the Norwegian Children Acts of 1915, granting children 
born outside of wedlock the right to inherit from their fathers, relying mainly on Holthe’s 
(1985) study but also on other studies (Le Bouteillec, 2003; Haavet, 2006). Next, I will 
examine the Child Welfare Act of 1953, granting new preventive duties to child protective 
services, using Larsen’s (2002) book, complemented by the works of Seip (1987) and 
Andresen (2006). Finally, I will focus on the Child Welfare Act of 1992, which reinforced the 
legal protection of parents and children, drawing from Ericsson (2000), Larsen (2002) and 
Stang (2007). The analysis will show the enormous shift in forms of control as well as how 
control became less explicit in the course of a development beginning with a law aimed at 
combating criminality and ending with a law based upon (universal) psychological knowledge 
of child development.   
 
Act on the treatment of neglected children of 1896 
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Dahl’s examination of the 1896 Act on the protection of neglected children has understood it 
as an ‘enterprise in crime control’ (p. 18). She argues that the aim of the 1896 Act was to 
defend society against crime through focusing on delinquent and neglected children and 
youth. The aims of Dahl’s study were twofold: On the one hand, it tried to show the 
emergence of criminology as resulting from the interplay between scientific processes and 
social and political processes. On the other hand, it was also aimed at revealing criminology’s 
embeddedness in the Child Welfare Act.  
According to Dahl, the 1870–1890 periods witnessed constitutional struggles. In 1884, 
the Liberal opposition took power and soon appointed two committees to prepare a new 
criminal Act. The committees’ chair was Bernhard Getz, a conservative lawyer and public 
prosecutor and its main task to examine legal procedures in criminal cases, while its other task 
was to draft a proposal for a revised criminal code (Dahl, 1985). Getz’s propositions 
regarding child welfare were first drafted as part of the reform of the criminal code. Getz’s 
1886 reform proposal included raising the age of criminal responsibility from 10 to 16 years 
and opening state reform schools for wayward youth (Dahl, 1985). The Penal Law 
commission approved much of Getz’s proposals, but suggested treating the issue of ‘neglected 
and morally depraved children’ in a separate Act. 
The 1892 draft extended the target of the law to all children at risk of becoming 
criminals. Getz emphasised the state’s responsibility for social defence: He argued that charity 
and love were insufficient to fight juvenile delinquency. Consequently, the state had to take 
responsibility for reform schools traditionally managed by philanthropic organisations. As 
Dahl notes, this emphasis on the state’s responsibility for social control was not specific to 
Norway but was a broader European trend. Furthermore, she showed that the 1896 Act was 
based on new scientific ideas coming from abroad.  
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Getz included references to international developments in his bill, especially from 
within the field of criminology (Dahl, 1985). Criminology at that time borrowed its theories 
and its methods from the natural sciences. Moreover, it was much concerned with preventing 
the development of crime and improving human behaviour. Additionally, Dahl notes that 
Getz’s proposal reflected both individual and social deterministic features: At the individual 
level, the source of crime was located in the child; at the social level, Getz located the origins 
of crime in poor living conditions. 
Dahl (1985) relates the success of the reform proposal to the fact that the provisions of 
the 1896 Act satisfied the demands of two professional groups: lawyers and teachers. Not 
surprisingly, lawyers and prison officials received Getz’s proposal with enthusiasm. They 
supported the crime prevention and social defence aspects of the reform. Moreover, the Act 
received the support of teachers. The latter professionals were unanimous on the need for 
segregating the so-called ‘vicious or morally depraved children’ (Dahl, 1985, p. 121) in order 
to render primary schools suitable for children from different social classes. The child welfare 
Act of 1896 offered a practical solution to this issue by specific institutions for youngsters 
defined as deviant. According to Dahl, the backing of lawyers and teachers contributed to 
support for the Act from both the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party.  
The 1896 Act marks the emergence of new responsibilities for the state with regard to 
children. It emphasized the importance of upbringing rather than punishment in order to fight 
criminality and granted extensive powers to local child welfare boards composed of judges 
and non-professionals. These powers included the possibility of depriving parents of parental 
authority and of placing a child in out-of-home care, mainly reformatories. Children under 
school age, and ‘mildly deprived’ youngsters (as cited in Dahl, 1985, p. 99) could be sent to a 
foster home. Dependent on the choice of placement, the measure defined the norm breaker as 
either the parents or the child. Controlling children and families and protecting society from 
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undesirable members were the act’s explicit goals while criminological knowledge operating 
by means of observation and classification of individuals (central mechanisms in disciplinary 
power) served as its foundation.  
 
Norwegian Children Acts of 1915 
The Castbergske Children Acts consisted of six laws proposed already in 1909 by Johan 
Castberg, but not voted until 1915 because of their radicalism. They introduced important 
changes in two main areas: at the economic and practical level, and at the level of family law. 
According Holthe (1985), these Acts first established both parents as responsible for their 
children’s maintenance, moral education and instruction. This dual responsibility meant that 
both two parents had to share equally the financial cost related to the child’s education. 
Moreover, the Acts made the authorities responsible for demanding financial contributions 
from fathers of children born outside of wedlock. The acts also provided for financial 
assistance to single mothers in case of fathers’ insufficient resources. 
Secondly, the Acts granted children born outside of wedlock the right to inherit from 
their father and to bear the family name of their father. Holthe (1985) points out that the 
inheritance clause represented the most controversial aspect of the Acts, requiring lawyers to 
re-think their practices in relation to children. Indeed, by relating inheritance rights to blood 
ties and not to the ties shaped through sharing a common place of residence, the Children Acts 
broke with the previous family concept based on the household (Holthe, 1985). They enlarged 
family ties outside of the household. By clarifying the rights and duties between family 
members, the Acts represented a central step in affirming the state’s responsibility for 
children and for their status within family and society (Le Bouteillec, 2003).  
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As mentioned above, granting rights to children born outside of wedlock were at the 
core of these new acts. Analysing parliamentary debates, Holthe (1985) focuses on the 
arguments used in support of and against granting children born out of wedlock the right to 
inherit from their father and bear the family name of the biological father. She identifies 
arguments related to the institution of marriage, the protection of the family, the child’s 
interest, and mother and father’s interests. Whereas the opponents of the reform warned of the 
risks of destroying marriage, family and the moral order, those calling for reform claimed that 
by encouraging fathers to take their responsibilities for their offspring, this would contribute 
to reinforcing the institution of marriage. Further, the defenders of the law mobilised 
arguments related to gender equality, claiming that men and women should have equal 
responsibility for providing for their children. At that time, these arguments became part of 
the call for justice and equality centred around the questions of women’s rights. Holthe also 
notes that both sides in the debate used the child’s interest as an argument. They disagreed, 
however, about the meaning of the child’s interest and how the latter should be balanced with 
other interests. Amongst the arguments used by the defenders of the inheritance rights was the 
idea that children born outside of wedlock were not culpable, and that a child had the right to 
know both parents.  
Although it is clear that, as pointed by Seip (1994a), the protection of women and 
children was a central consideration, other concerns were involved. The Children Acts of 
1915 reflected a preoccupation with national efficiency (Seip, 1987), social utility (Le 
Bouteillec, 2003) and quality of populations (Haavet, 2006; Seip, 1987). Moreover, Le 
Bouteillec (2003) argues that these children were viewed as a danger to the social order due to 
their exposure to moral dangers. She notes that the extension of inheritance rights to new 
groups of children was a way to integrate them into the social order. 
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In contrast to the previous law of 1896, this parliamentary bill was grounded in new 
statistical and medical knowledge. According to Holthe (1985), a survey on children’s living 
conditions conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics had previously demonstrated a 
higher percentage of infant mortality during the first year of life among children born outside 
of wedlock. Explanations proposed to explain this higher mortality were bad hygiene, 
inherited diseases and, above all, artificial nutrition, or, as Haavet (2006) puts it, ‘the lack of 
mother’s milk’ (p. 195). Medical knowledge supported the idea that infant mortality could be 
prevented (Haavet, 2006).The reform proposal emphasised fathers’ financial responsibility to 
allow mothers to stay at home in the period following the birth, so that they could care for 
their children and breastfeed them (Haavet, 2006, p. 193). Combining medical knowledge and 
state responsibility, the Children Acts reflected researchers’ and social reformers’ trust in the 
state’s capacity to ‘improve human and social life’ (Haavet, 2006, p. 201) through education 
and rational means. 
In Norwegian child protection history, these child welfare laws lined to Castberg’s 
work represented a turning point in public welfare with their focus on children’s living 
conditions and fathers’ financial obligations. Nonetheless, a different reading of the values 
reflected in the Children Acts of 1915 gives a societal picture reflecting the ethos of the 
liberal segment of the dominant classes, of which Castberg was a member. With their 
emphasis on parental responsibility and sexual morality, the Acts also reflect the struggles 
between different segments of the dominant classes for a legitimate representation of family 
(See Lenoir, 2003). They targeted on the one hand, the individual bodies of fathers, mothers 
and children, and involved issues of sexual morals and breastfeeding, and on the other hand, 
the life of an entire population as reflected in the concern for infant mortality rates. Individual 
bodies and population represent two poles in the particular form of power that Foucault 
(1976) has labelled as ‘bio politics’, referring to power mechanisms aim at regulating and 
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controlling  the bodies of individuals and entire  populations. As mentioned, the new 
legislation was grounded in demographic statistics, allowing the counting and classification of 
children representing a form of knowledge typically associated with bio politics. The law 
targeted some segments in the Norwegian society, the unwed mothers and working class 
families, both considered as potential sources of unrest. The objective of protecting society 
against the moral danger these segments represented for children’s morality was part of the 
reformers’ goals, but this goal was not as explicit as in 1896. Instead, children’s rights, 
interests and equality were the main justifications for the reform. 
 
Child Welfare Act of 1953 
The Castbergske children laws went unchanged until the 1950s when radical changes in 
legislation took place. In particular, these involved legislation focused on regulating 
biological ties between children and mothers and fathers and parental responsibilities, giving 
fathers economic obligations only in case of proven paternity and establishing the state as 
provider in case of unknown father or dead father.  An additional equally significant change 
was represented by a new law regulating child protection, which is the subject of the 
following examination.  
The year 1953 witnessed the first broad-scale reform of child protection since the Act 
of 1896 on the treatment of neglected children. In 1947, the Ministry of Social Affairs 
appointed a child protection committee charged with reconsidering existing child welfare 
legislation. This committee emphasized the need for rationalisation and coordination of child 
welfare and the government decided to assemble previous laws targeted at poor and 
vulnerable children into one unique piece of legislation. The resulting Child Welfare Act was 
passed in 1953. This contained two major innovations: prevention and family support. The 
Act’s first paragraph emphasized the general preventative duties of Child Protective Services.  
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This passage obligated Child Protective Services to work towards improving children’s living 
conditions and providing them with opportunities for development (Larsen, 2002). Moreover, 
the new legislation widened the range of assistance measures to families, including advice and 
guidance, economic support, registration in a kindergarten and family monitoring (Larsen, 
2002; see also Andresen, 2006).  
Relying on an analysis of the preparatory work, Larsen (2002) argues that the 
legitimation basis for state intervention shifted from the interests of society to the support of 
the parents in their parental responsibility and caring obligations. The project of fostering 
good citizens was not abandoned, but instead was dealt with in a more indirect way—that is, 
through the protection of the family and the provision of good living conditions for all 
children. The emphasis on the protection of the family in the preparatory work should be 
viewed in relation to the restoration of the male breadwinner position in Western societies 
following the end of World War II (Michel, 2011). In Norway, the implementation of social 
policies, notably child benefits in 1946, reinforced the male breadwinner model, supporting a 
strong family ideal (Andresen, 2006; Haavet, 2006). However, Larsen (2002) notes that this 
emphasis on the protection of the family was reflected neither in the Act’s goals nor in 
concrete provisions enunciating the criteria of intervention. Indeed, the central focus of the 
Act was the child’s interest, not the family’s interests. 
According to Seip (1987), the preparatory work for the 1953 reform involved a new 
knowledge basis. During the inter-war period, new ways of thinking grounded in hygienist 
and psychiatric doctrines had emerged to challenge the traditional moralistic attitudes towards 
deviant children based on religion and Puritanism (Seip, 1987). The key concept of this period 
according to her was the concept of ‘care’, and the new understanding of children’s needs, 
grounded in medicine, psychology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis and pedagogy, emphasised 
stability and belonging (Larsen, 2002; Andresen, 2006).  
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The Norwegian Labour Party played a leading role in the preparatory work for this 
legislation (Larsen, 2002). Political disagreement concentrated on the location of the 
boundaries between parental and society’s responsibilities and on the various roles lay people 
and different professional groups should take in decision-making. This act stipulated that a 
judge was to be involved only when coercion was to be used. While the Labour Party was 
opposed to having doctors as permanent members of the child welfare board in the 
communities, the Christian People’s Party and the Conservative Party fought to maintain the 
place of traditional authorities — doctors and priests (Larsen, 2002). There was, however, a 
broad consensus shared by professional and political actors regarding the move from coercion 
to help. Larsen (2002) notes that despite the law’s intention to emphasize help, coercive 
interventions did not disappear, but only became less visible. The 1953 Child Welfare Act in 
effect renewed the coercive provisions of the 1896 Act: this meant that when inadequate 
parental care resulted in damage or a danger to the child’s health and development, a care 
order could be implemented (Larsen, 2002). 
This new legislation reflected a change in the modalities of state control of families 
and the means of legitimizing child protection interventions. In contrast to earlier laws, it 
granted a larger place to in-home and voluntary interventions. Moreover, the legitimation of 
child protection interventions relied increasingly on helping families and preventing negative 
outcomes for children, rather than on defending society against moral danger. Thus, 
interventions in families involved less overt forms of coercion and more measures having the 
appearance of help, support and care. The affirmation of a new knowledge regime, revolving 
around psychology and related disciplines, provided a main support for the development of 
more subtle, and implicit, forms of control (Foucault, 1980; Hennum, 2010). 
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Child Welfare Act of 1992 
According to Larsen (2002), the preparatory work leading to the Child Welfare Act of 1992 
began in the late 1960s, but in what follows, for the sake of clarity, I concentrate on the period 
between 1985 and 1992, a period marked by various texts preparing the amendment of the 
new law. A central intention of this new law was to reinforce due process for both parents and 
children. This change was made by transferring the responsibility for taking decisions on care 
orders (that is, coercive out-of-home placements) to a court-like agency, fylkesnemnda 
(Larsen, 2002). At the same time, the new legislation widened the criteria for implementing a 
care order, making both an unacceptable care situation in the present and a risk of future 
damage to the child sufficient for justifying a care order, independently of each other (Larsen, 
2002).  
The emphasis on due process should not obscure the fact that the boundaries between 
voluntary interventions and coercive interventions tend to be blurred. Voluntary measures 
could in practice incorporate hidden forms of coercion (Stang, 2007). For example, the Child 
Welfare Act (1992) § 4-8 opened up the possibility of transforming a voluntary out-of-home 
placement into a care order, even though the conditions otherwise required for implementing 
a care order, such as  neglect, were  not satisfied (Stang, 2007). According to Stang (2007), 
decisions made according to  § 4-8 for  preventing the removal of a child in order to avoid 
serious problems for the child due to the breaking of the attachment bond to foster caregivers 
derive from considerations of stability, security and continuity of care. This was done in 
accordance with emphasis on promoting the best interests of the child as defined in § 4-1.  
Another important change relates to the status of the child. Ericsson (2000) showed 
that the 1992 Child Welfare Act, worked to provide children with the status of ‘separate 
individuals with legally guaranteed rights’ (p. 19). The new legislation affirmed the primacy 
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of the best interests of the child in all decisions (Ericsson, 2000; Stang, 2007). Moreover, the 
1992 Child Welfare Act (§ 6-3) granted children above 12 years of age the right to be heard.  
The Child Welfare Act of 1992 clearly states the primacy of the best interests of the child 
(Stang, 2007). Although  protecting society against dangerous children is no longer a 
legitimate ground to intervene, as Sandberg (2003) notes, the child’s interest and the society’s 
interest often coincide, so that considerations of societal interest are much involved with this 
act,  in combination with the best interests of the child.  
Additionally, the preparatory work during the 1980s retained the family treatment 
principle and reaffirmed the centrality of the family institution in society, emphasising the 
‘biological principle’. The biological principle entails that children should grow up with their 
biological families, and that, if they are separated, maintaining contact with their biological 
parents has a value in itself (Bendiksen, 2008: 164). However, according to Larsen (2002), 
later preparatory work and public documents downplayed the family treatment principle, and 
Ericsson (2000) notes that in the Child Welfare Act of 1992 psychological ties tended to take 
precedence over biological ones. More recently, the perception of children’s needs of secure 
attachment ties resulted in 2012 of a public report on the protection of children’s 
development. The Raundalen committee (NOU, 2012:5) not only underlined the ambiguities 
of the biological principle and contested the position of this principle as a basic principle of 
child welfare policies, but also stated the primacy of psychological parenting over biological 
parenting. 
Psychology, especially developmental psychology, became a key component of the 
knowledge base of the Child Welfare Act (1992). A psychology-grounded understanding of 
children entails viewing them as emotional beings and vulnerable subjects in need, while 
parents, especially mothers, are defined as those responsible for the satisfaction of those needs 
(Burman, 2008; Hennum, 2010). Moreover, as Hennum (2010) points out, the emergence of 
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an alliance between a legal perspective and the now well-established, psychological 
understanding of children gave rise to a new form of parental disciplining based on universal 
standards for childhood and adulthood (Pence & Hix-small, 2009). 
According to Larsen (2002), the reform of 1992 was the object of a broad consensus. 
She notes that all actors supported the shift towards putting greater emphasis on the child’s 
entitlements as an independent individual and reinforcing due process for both children and 
parents. However, social workers were exceptional in their defence of using coercion to 
promote children’s interests and the ‘child’s perspective’. Child welfare organisations, 
including the Norwegian union of child welfare workers  (Norges barnevernspedagog 
forbund) and the Norwegian union of social workers (Norsk sosionom forbund), positioned 
themselves as the defenders of the individual child’s interests; both argued that in cases where 
the interests of parents conflicted with that of the child, society had to side with the weakest 
part, i.e. the child (Larsen, 2002). This provides but one indicator of the important role child 
welfare professionals and their organisations played in the last phase of the reform work. Not 
only did they lobby for preserving child protection as a specific area of legislation, but also 
wrote their own proposals. Thanks to their ability to gain the support of parliamentary 
members from different parties, many of their propositions were implemented. 
The Child Welfare Act of 1992 exhibits continuity with the previous Act of 1953,  
with its emphasis on the help, support and caring dimensions, and a broad consensus about 
state interventions in families which reflects social acceptance of state control of families. At 
the same time, the 1992 Act entails slightly different forms of power based on the child’s 
perspective and a new view of the child as an individual with entitlements making control 
even more implicit. As Hennum (2010) has noted about divorce-related issues, the child’s 
perspective represents an especially efficient discursive resource for silencing the controlling 
elements in child welfare. With the child as target for state intervention and subject for state 
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governance, the law of 1992 has paved the way for greater possibilities for indirectly 
regulating family life (Hennum 2010). Indeed, opposing arguments related to children’s well-
being is difficult, if not impossible. 
 
Concluding discussion 
This article has used the Norwegian case to exemplify transformations in the forms of the 
state’s control of families. What can we conclude from this overview of the transformations of 
child welfare in Norway since the late nineteenth century? In summarising those 
developments, I have resisted the temptation to construct an artificial continuity between the 
four historical scenarios I have examined (Foucault, 1984). Indeed, the historical development 
of child protection laws and policies in the Norwegian society does not reflect a linear 
evolution (Larsen, 2002). This is probably not a characteristic confined only to Norway as a 
modern state. 
The modalities of state interventions in families, and hence the forms of power 
involved, have significantly changed over the course of the twentieth century. From being part 
of criminal law and poor law, child protection regulations have been assembled in an 
autonomous piece of legislation. This constitution of child protection regulations as an 
autonomous law makes the connections between child protection, the prevention of 
delinquency and the management of the poor much less explicit. Moreover, the shift of 
emphasis from societal control to the well-being and rights of the individual child has 
contributed to effectively silencing certain of the controlling elements in child welfare. 
Political forces and professional actors behind these legislative changes have varied 
during the past century of legal reform. In 1896 and 1915, conservative and liberal forces 
played a leading role. In contrast, the Labour Party played a central role in the post-war 
reforms of child protection regulations. In 1953 and in 1992, all political parties agreed on the 
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state’s right and duty to intervene in families. Given that broader political democratisation 
leads to greater legitimacy of state intervention (Slagstad, 2001), it is conceivable that greater 
democratisation of political life has at the same time contributed to the wide acceptance of 
state intervention in families.   
This has created a paradoxical situation.  On the one hand,  the Norwegian society is 
proud of its high level of democratisation, even though some of its citizens, namely, parents, 
have been the subject of great state scrutiny and have lost their own power in contrast to their  
empowered children. As the Children Act of 1992 requires, all agencies and individuals in 
contact with children have a duty to report to child protection services deviance in parental 
care. Yet, deviance and children’s interests as moral phenomena are rarely discussed.  
In the entire period under study, both social sciences and the humanities have served 
to legitimize increasing intervention in families using as their main rationale a set of beliefs in 
rational and positivistic knowledge. Nonetheless, over time, knowledge regimes have changed 
their content and form.  In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the hegemonic knowledge regime 
justifying state intervention in families in the late was structured around criminology, 
statistics and medicine.  In contrast, in the post-World War II period, reforms of child welfare 
law have drawn from a knowledge regime much influenced by psychology. As this 
discipline’s production of knowledge about individuals supports more sophisticated and less 
overt forms of control, the shift from criminal science and statistics to understandings of our 
psyches has tended to become a precondition for transforming aspects of state control of 
families as discussed in this article. 
From the late nineteenth century, a new principle of order has emerged, a principle 
described in Norway and elsewhere as ‘egalitarian individualism’ (Gullestad, 1992, Therborn, 
1993). This principle was reflected for the first time in legislation in the 1915 Norwegian 
Children Acts. I have argued that the transformation in the forms of control of families was 
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concomitant with important changes in the nature of the social order, the emphasis on children 
as independent subjects entitled to care, and equal opportunities for development.  These I 
maintain have worked to make the controlling elements in child protection covert. Beginning 
with the 1915 Norwegian Children Acts, Norwegian laws have reflected norms and discourses 
of egalitarian individualism. As individuals gradually internalised these norms and discourses, 
the control of families became increasingly implicit. Indeed, the value given to children’s 
equality and autonomy now justifies intervening in families for a multitude of reasons. I 
would contend that, whereas in familialism, which focuses on the family unit, family is ‘le 
principe de toute chose (the principle of everything)’ (Lenoir, 2005, p. 202), egalitarian 
individualism has constituted children as ‘the principle of everything’. 
That help and control go hand in hand is a well-known phenomenon within child 
protection. However, in Norway, a country renowned for promoting the values of equality, 
individual independence and tolerance, the current professional discursive formation and 
significant parts of social research on children emphasise viewing children as participants, 
hearing children’s voices and valuing the child’s perspective, all while masking the very real 
controlling elements in child welfare.  
The article has shown that the state control of families, far from being explicit, has 
become increasingly implicit and hidden. Indeed, the emphasis on children as independent 
individuals has made opposing this control increasingly difficult to do. These findings have 
important implications for social work. Indeed, in Norway, social workers have played a 
leading role in promoting the child perspective and social work research seems to follow the 
same path. Thus, there is a need for research critically examining the implications of the 
child’s perspective. Moreover, the analysis of Norway has a broader relevance as EU 
countries today may be following the same path without being fully aware of the 
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ramifications of child-centrism for state control of families. The consequences of child 
centrism and implicit state control of families, i.e. adults, is yet to be investigated. 
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i In the rest of the article, I will use the English version from 1985. 
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